02:07
Japan’s small-sized firms struggle to offer higher pay to keep up with inflation
Japan’s small-sized firms struggle to offer higher pay to keep up with inflation
In the past decade, there were suggestions that China – whose non-financial corporate debt has surged since the 2008 crisis, whose economic model is characterised by overinvestment, a high savings rate and suppressed consumption and whose property bubble has begun to deflate – could be turning Japanese.Koo revived these fears last month when he warned that China was likely to enter a balance sheet recession and needed to take urgent action to head off a protracted, Japanese-style downturn.
He is not the only economist sounding the alarm over “Japanification”. Citigroup, which warned earlier this year that today’s China looks “strikingly similar” to post-bubble Japan, said last week that China was on the brink of a “confidence trap as the reopening impulse starts to fade”.Given how bleak sentiment towards China is right now, these fears risk becoming self-fulfilling. Yet, the differences between China and Japan are far more consequential than the similarities.
First, because Chinese policymakers are sensitive to the mistakes made by Japan, it is unlikely they would allow a full-blown balance sheet recession to take hold. Beijing has had plenty of time to learn from Tokyo’s costly policy blunders.China can’t afford to wait and see about economic stimulus
Second, comparisons between China and Japan are inapt in several crucial areas. Not only did Japan allow the yen to strengthen sharply in the years preceding and following the bursting of its bubble, it kept real interest rates above the rate of economic growth and maintained an overly restrictive fiscal stance in the 1990s.
By contrast, China carefully manages its currency, ensuring the yuan trades in a tight range versus other major currencies. More importantly, China benefits from its state-owned financial system that makes a systemic crisis in the banking sector highly unlikely. Furthermore, strict controls on the country’s capital account significantly reduce the risk of major capital flight.Third, the declines in asset prices in China, particularly in the property market, have been nowhere near as catastrophic as the falls in Japan in 1990 and the US in 2008. Beijing’s penchant for control – as opposed to Japan’s more market-driven system – not only provides a financial backstop, it helps buy China time to shift to a consumption-driven growth model, a conceivable prospect given that it still has plenty of economic catching-up to do.To be sure, worrying demographic trends, acute geopolitical tensions and much deeper global economic integration than in the 1990s make China more vulnerable in some respects.Yet, the bigger the vulnerabilities, the stronger the likelihood that Beijing will deliver the necessary fiscal stimulus to kick-start growth. Renewed fears of a balance sheet recession in China could be the necessary catalyst to force Beijing’s hand.
Nicholas Spiro is a partner at Lauressa Advisory
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